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AN ANALYSIS OF ATHLETE AGENT
CERTIFICATION AND REGULATION: NEW
INCENTIVES WITH OLD PROBLEMS
Bart Ivan Ring*
It has become an all too familiar refrain in the arena of professional
sports: the present day athlete is "uneducated, .... untutored," "unaware,"
or "unwise."' So the story goes: highly talented, much heralded col-
legiate superstar signs with the proverbial unscrupulous player agent
who exerts total control over the unsuspecting athlete's career and subse-
quently, through fraud and deceit, diverts all of the client's funds into
risky investments and high-priced swampland. This scenario has been
replayed and repeated over and over again amid a backdrop of escalating
player salaries and increasing adulation showered continuously upon the
athletic superstar in today's society.
Additionally, sports agents have been described as destructive, devi-
ous and inept.2 Their greed for money and lust for the headlines com-
bined with an apparent penchant for preying upon unsuspecting young
adults like a pack of locusts, has cast an ominous and everlasting cloud
upon the profession. It is a very lethal combination. Naive and unso-
phisticated athletes are exposed to the foreign terrain of high finance, a
field heavily laden with immorality and instability. This mixture has un-
ceremoniously placed the professional sports agent in an unenviable posi-
tion of being a necessary evil disrespected by the great majority of
individuals associated with professional sports.3
In the past decade there has been a dramatic escalation in the sup-
port for increased regulation and supervision of the heretofore un-
restricted activities of the sports agent. All certification mechanisms are
* Bart Ivan Ring received a B.A. degree in Print Journalism from the University of
Southern California (1982) and his J.D. degree from Southwestern University School of Law
(1985). Mr. Ring practices law in the Los Angeles area and is a well-respected agent repre-
senting athletes in all sports.
1. Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717, 726 (S.D. Cal. 1960);
Comment, Regulating the Professional Sports Agent: Is California in the Right Ballpark? 15
PAC. L.J. 1231, 1234 (1984).
2. See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS (1979).
3. Comment, The Agent-Athlete Relationship in Professional and Amateur Sports: The
Inherent Potential for Abuse and the Need for Regulation, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 815, 816 n.7
(1981).
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intended to alter the prevailing atmosphere of distrust and corruption
into one which promotes confidence and respect in the player
representative.
While the regulatory systems have the same avowed purpose4 the
potential for abuse is still very much a reality. This article will explore
the advent of certification processes instituted by player associations and
the California State Legislature. Whether it be in the field of individual
contract negotiations, financial planning and/or endorsements, the scope
of the agent's responsibilities has been expanded through these attempts
to refine and improve the status of the professional player representative.
I. RECURRING PROBLEMS
In the traditional athlete-agent relationship, the representative will
promise to perform services such as "contract negotiation, investment
advice and promotional services." 5 Despite the relatively recent develop-
ment of the prominence of the sports agent in the professional battlefield,
there is already a long litany of client dissatisfaction and judicial proceed-
ings which underscore the vast problems inherent in the field.6 More-
over, the level of displeasure has been aggravated by the fact that many
involved in the profession do not share the view that regulation and certi-
fication procedures are needed to rectify the problem.7
The list of unethical practices and behavior reads like a "how to"
booklet on the many ways to "siphon-off" a client's funds with very little
money down or energy expended: fraud, misappropriation of funds,
breach of fiduciary duties, conflicts of interest, fee gouging and embezzle-
ment are the most common forms of under-handed activities and con-
duct. In short, the athlete is not the recipient of the services he was
promised.
A great number of the aforementioned problems associated with
athlete-agent relationships can be directly traced to the overall lack of
stringent guidelines that effectively eliminate ill-equipped representatives
from entering the sports agency profession.
The term "agency," is defined as a "consensual, fiduciary relation
4. See NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS (1983) at 1 [hereinaf-
ter "NFLPA REGULATIONS"].
5. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 2, § 318 at 326.
6. Comment, supra note 3, at 815.
7. Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Professional Sports, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 290 (1976). Sports agent Jerry Kapstein stated: "We are an extremely small industry; a
small amount of clients and even a smaller amount of representatives .... It does not take
very long for the grapevine to weed out the bad apples among us." Id.
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between two persons, created by law by which one, the principal has a
right to control the conduct of the agent, and the agent has a power to
affect the legal relations of the principal."8 Agency law does not require
the agent to have any technical expertise. An individual "who can act
for himself is generally capable of acting as (an) agent for another ... "I
It is this relative ease of entry into the professional scene that has initi-
ated reform and increased supervision of the player representative.' 0
Due to this relative non-existence of formal barriers preventing an
individual to act as an agent, there has been a large influx of individuals
from an even larger array of backgrounds who have attempted to cash in
on the athlete sweepstakes." As both money and prestige have grown
synonymous within the agency field, the incidents of unqualified agents
entering the marketplace has risen steadily.'E
Whether it be a sports writer,' 3 building contractor,'
4 accountant,' 5
attorney,' 6 the evidence of abuse and overreaching is quite evident.
Although the occurrence of unethical practices appear to happen in con-
nection with non-attorney representatives more so than with practicing
attorneys, it would be naive to pinpoint one sector of individuals as the
main culprit in stifling the eradication of deceit in the profession.' 7 With
so much at stake, the chance for wrongdoing is all-encompassing during
the recruitment and actual representation of the athlete.' 8
In People v. Sorkin,'9 a former sports writer entered into the sports
agent profession and promised to advise and counsel his clients on fi-
nances and investments while reviewing their taxes. E0 Sorkin had no pre-
vious experience in negotiating professional contracts nor did he have
8. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 29 (1972).
9. Id.
10. Comment, supra note 3, at 832.
11. Comment, supra note 1, at 1231 n.6.
12. See Kennedy & Williamson, Money: The Monster Threatening Sports, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, July 17, 1978, at 46-5 1; Williams Gladiator Traps. A Primer on the Representation of
Black Athletes, 9 BLACK L.J. 263, 271 n.86 (1986); Note, Agents of Professional Athletes, 15
NEW ENG. L. REV. 545 (1980).
13. See People v. Sorkin, No. 46429 slip op. (Nassau County, N.Y. Ct. Nov. 28, 1977)
aff'd, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 772 (App. Div. 2d Dep't, July 24, 1978).
14. Williams, supra note 12, at 264.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1231.
18. See Comment, supra note 3, at 815.
19. See Sorkin, No. 46429 slip op. (Nassau County, N.Y. Ct. Nov. 28, 1977) aff'd, 407
N.Y.S. 2d 772 (App. Div. 2d Dep't, July 24, 1978).
20. Montgomery, The Spectacular Rise and Ignoble Fall of Richard Sorkin, Pros' Agent,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1977, § 5, at 1, col. 1.
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any legal training. 2I Nevertheless, through his connections initiated by
his brother-in-law,2 2 Sorkin garnered a group of successful clients. As
the athletes embarked on their athletic career, the agency agreements en-
tered into between Sorkin and his clients included the requirement that
all paychecks issued to the players would be sent directly to his office.2 3
Although the funds were sent to Sorkin for investment purposes, Sorkin
was using his client's monies to support a gambling habit.24
Sorkin's propensity to wager on sporting events led to an estimated
$626,000 loss to his clients. 21 Moreover, his inexperience in financial af-
fairs and investments led to a monetary loss of $271,000 for the ath-
letes.26 Unfortunately, the remedy for the players proved to be grossly
inadequate and the profession of professional representation of sports
figures suffered another black eye to its already tarnished image.27
A common practice during the earliest developmental stages of the
profession included the agent collecting a large lump sum fee in advance
from his client.28 While this procedure enables the agent to receive a fee
regardless of whether or not the athlete remains employed for the dura-
tion of the negotiated contract, 29 the inequitable results of this practice
has traditionally been deemed unconscionable.
In Brown v. Woolf,3° a professional hockey player employed agent-
attorney Robert Woolf to negotiate a contract with the Pittsburgh Pen-
guins franchise of the National Hockey League (NHL).3" The scenario
unfolded during an era which saw the growth of the rival World Hockey
Association (WHA) and the increased opportunity for players to use
21. Id. at 15, col. 1.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 15, col. 4.
24. Id. at 15, col. 1.
25. Id. at 15, col. 6.
26. Id.
27. Sorkin's misuse of his client's funds affected more than 50 professional hockey and
basketball players. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1237.
28. For example, an athlete who signed a two-year non-guaranteed contract for a com-
bined total of $500,000 would compensate his agent by paying the agent's entire commission
based upon their agreed fee for the agent's services. Thus, an agent charging a fee of five
percent would receive $25,000 irrespective of whether the athlete collects any portion of the
negotiated agreement.
29. According to NFLPA records, very few contracts are now guaranteed. Unless a
player is injured, he will probably not be entitled to any additional year(s) on his contract if, in
fact, he does not perform for the particular franchise. Only the very elite (e.g., Dan Marino,
John Elway, Walter Payton) of the active members of the NFL receive fully guaranteed con-
tracts from their respective clubs. (Information received from Mike Duberstein, Director of
Research of the NFLPA).
30. 554 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
31. Id. at 1207.
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each league as a crucial bargaining tool throughout the negotiation pro-
cess. Woolf advised his client to reject an offer from the Penguins and
recommended that Brown pursue a proposal from the WHA.32 After
Woolf negotiated a five-year contract with the WHA team, the instability
of the fledgling league forced a renegotiation of the terms of the original
agreement.33
The new terms actually reduced the compensation afforded to
Woolf's client and included the subtraction of a retirement fund estab-
lished in the initial bargaining process.34 Despite the large reduction in
compensation, Woolf attempted to collect his fee from his client irrespec-
tive of the now diluted value of the contract. 3" Woolf sought compensa-
tion for his services based upon the full value of the contract prior to any
of these subsequent reductions in value.36
Brown received approximately twenty-four percent of the amount
he was entitled to pursuant to the original agreement.37 In turn, Woolf
received a fee of twenty-one percent based upon what his client re-
ceived.38 Such facts are consistent with the modern trend that most ath-
lete-agent fee schedules are now based upon the monies actually received
by the player.39
The presence of overreaching and misrepresentation is not relegated
to journeyman ballplayers and "run of the mill" athletes. In Detroit
Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz," Billy Sims, former Heisman Trophy winner and
all-time leading rusher in Detroit Lion history, was caught in a cycle of
misrepresentation and conflicts of interest which was played out during
the emergence of the United States Football League (USFL).41 Sims al-
leged that a contract negotiated by his agent Jerry Argovitz with the
USFL Houston Gamblers was invalid due to the unethical behavior of
his representative.42 The allegations included fraud, misrepresentation
and a breach of fiduciary duty.43
Although Argovitz was president of the Gamblers' franchise, he still








39. See NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at 9.
40. 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 543-44.
43. Id. at 543.
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ton ballclub against the National Football League's (NFL) Detroit
franchise." Despite a clear presence of a conflict of interest, Argovitz
acted as Sims's advisor.
Sims signed a contract with the Gamblers on July 1, 1983.15 Soon
thereafter Sims entered into a second contract with the Lions (December
16, 1983) for his future services. At the time of Sims's agreement with
the Houston team, he was unaware of his representative's position and
interest in the USFL franchise.4 Throughout the negotiations, Argovitz
made statements which influenced his client to jump to the rival football
league.4" During the critical stages of the negotiations, Argovitz in-
formed sources connected with the Houston team of the amount of
money offered by the Lions and the amount of compensation required to
lure him away from the NFL ballclub.48 Moreover, Argovitz misrepre-
sented to his client that the Lions and their management were negotiat-
ing in bad faith and that the Gamblers could be much more receptive to
his contractual demands.49
Sims, believing the representations of his agent, was convinced that
the Lions were not interested in signing him to another contract. 50 In
direct response to the advice of Argovitz, Sims instructed his agent to
cease contact of any sort with the Lions and agreed soon thereafter to
sign the July agreement with the Houston Gamblers. 51
The court ruled that Argovitz breached his fiduciary duty owed to
his client by not contacting the Lion management with the terms of the
Gamblers' final offer. Without this contact with the Detroit manage-
ment, Argovitz deprived his client as to making an intelligent and in-
formed decision as to which club offered the most attractive
44. Id. at 544. "Even the USFL Constitution itself forbids a holder of any interest in a
member club from acting 'as the contracting agent or representative for any player.' " Id.
45. Id. at 545.
46. Id. at 544-45.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 545.
49. Id. at 545-49.
50. Id.
51. Id. Moreover, the presence of abuse in the compensation for the agent's services was
apparent during the negotiations. The Gamblers offered Sims a $3.5 million five-year contract,
including skill and injury guarantees and a $500,000 loan at one percent over prime. Argovitz
was scheduled to receive $100,000 from this loan for acting as Sims's agent. Pro rated over the
lifetime of the contract, Argovitz's compensation is less than two and one half percent of the
total package. However, by receiving this portion of the loan immediately, he actually was
being compensated at an amount greater than twelve percent of the salary paid in the con-
tract's initial year. If Argovitz generated business through a corporation, then, under an ac-
crual accounting method, he would have tax liability in the first year. Therefore, the dollars
are more advantageous on a present value basis if immediately received.
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compensatory package.52 It is clear that if Argovitz in fact had no pecu-
niary interest in the Houston Gamblers franchise he would have imple-
mented a strategy by which both the Gamblers and Lions would have
been encouraged to take part in a bidding war for his client's rights."
Accordingly, the court rescinded the Sims-Gamblers agreement and
upheld Sims's signed agreement with the Detroit Lions.54 Nonetheless,
the athlete lost a unique opportunity to receive a lucrative contract that
would be commensurate with other highly sought after personnel who
were signed by the Gamblers that particular year.55
This case also indicates that even the most visible and noteworthy
athletes are susceptible to the unethical conduct of sports agents. What
the aforementioned brief case study illustrates is the need for an effective
regulatory system designed to police a field wrought with instability and
unrestricted conduct.
II. REGULATION AND CERTIFICATION
In direct response to the myriad of reports outlining the problems
inherent in the field, various player associations and state legislators have
attempted to inject some sanity into the athlete-agent marketplace. The
National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) was the first or-
ganized body representing the direct interests of professional football
players to establish a regulatory system patrolling prospective player
representatives. 56
The 1982 collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter "CBA") en-
tered into between the NFLPA and the National Football League Man-
agement Council originally limited all player representation in individual
contract negotiations to the "NFLPA or its agent."57 In theory this pro-
vision appeared to deny undrafted and veteran free agent football players
the option of retaining and choosing their own contract advisor. 58 Subse-
quently, the NFLPA rectified this potential problem by enacting the
NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors.59
52. Id.
53. See Williams, supra note 12, at 270.
54. Detroit Lions, 580 F. Supp. at 544.
55. Id. at 546.
56. NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at i.
57. Collective Bargaining Agreement between National Football League Players Associa-
tion and National Football Management Council (1982) at 32 (hereinafter "Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement"].
58. Note, The NFL Players Association's Agent Certification Plan: Is it Exempt from Anti-
trust Review?, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 699 (Summer 1984).
59. Id.
1987]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
The main purpose of the regulations is to establish a network that
gleans the qualifications of player agents and creates minimum standards
of competence and more precise boundaries on fee compensation.' The
regulations have also affected the scope of the services performed by the
player's agent while alerting the athlete to potential contractual difficul-
ties that might occur in his future dealings with his agent.
The regulations request preliminary information on the applicant's
occupation, education, criminal convictions and any possible disciplinary
actions taken against the prospective agent.61 This data remains on file at
the NFLPA offices and is available to any athlete and his family for ver-
ification of the background and credentials of a particular agent.
A critical area addressed by the NFLPA regulations is the amount
of compensation charged by a player representative for his services. The
regulations sought to reform this area of abuse by requiring all athletes
and their agents to enter into a standard form representation agree-
ment.62 The form instructs all agents to comply with this prerequisite or
jeopardize their standing as a certified contract advisor.63
The standard agreement contains a fee schedule which outlines the
maximum amount an agent can charge his client purely for advice per-
taining to individual contract negotiations. An agent may charge his cli-
ent a higher rate than that prescribed by the NFLPA regulations only if
he is engaging in other forms of consultation. 4
The most pertinent aspects of the form include a requirement that
the advisor's compensation be limited to no more than ten percent of the
salary actually received by the athlete during the first year of any con-
tract or series of contracts negotiated on behalf of the player by the
agent.65 Moreover, the agent will receive the lesser of two fees (not to
exceed $1,000) should he negotiate a contract which nets the athlete the
minimum salary allowable in accordance with the athlete's years of ser-
vice category under the CBA. A similar sliding scale of fee compensa-
tion governs the remaining years of any multi-year agreement.66
A contract advisor may receive compensation in excess of the afore-
mentioned guidelines in cases of "exceptional achievement on behalf of
the player in negotiation of the player's contract(s) or in cases where an
60. See NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at i.
61. Id. at Exhibit A at Al.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id.
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extraordinary amount of additional time was necessary to effectively
complete the negotiation in question."67 A player representative is also
entitled to travel expenses and related costs in the negotiation of the
contract.68
The main thrust of the regulations and its effect on agent fees arise
in the realm of the actual definition of the term "compensation" and the
expanse of the agent's rights to share in the various types of bonus money
accrued by the athlete throughout the lifetime of the contract. The
NFLPA regulations define "compensation" as "salary, signing bonus, or
reporting bonus payments received by the player and attributable to the
base year(s) of the contract(s)., 69 In particular, the regulations stipulate
that the advisor shall not be entitled to receive a fee for "any incentive or
performance bonuses... or benefits of any kind received for a player's
services in the option year."70 This clause effectively eliminates a wide
range of potential fee compensation for the agent. This includes bonuses
attained by the athlete for Pro Bowl selection, yards gained in a season,
receptions, etc. Often, this can add up to substantial dividends for the
agent who shares in the achievements of the athlete on the playing field.
The regulations also demand that the agent may only receive his
compensation at the time the athlete receives the salary upon which the
fee is based.7 This provision guards against the previously common
practice of receiving a large sum of money up-front.72 The exclusion of
incentive and performance bonuses from the fee schedule of contract ad-
visors is an attempt at ensuring a more accurate relationship between the
services performed by the contract advisor and the coinciding benefit re-
ceived by the athlete.
Due to the development of the sports marketplace the professional
representative and his function as contract advisor for his client has been
dramatically modified. The value of an athlete entering the NFL draft is
dictated to a large extent on the round and overall selection position he is
chosen in the annual lottery of collegiate talent.73 Consequently, the
signing bonus, base salary and reporting bonus (usually not present in the
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id. at Exhibit C at C2.
69. Id. at 9.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id.
72. See Brown, 554 F. Supp. at 1206.
73. George Young, General Manager of the New York Football Giants, stated: "Because
of the publication of salaries by the union, agents should know the numbers... why we have
to go through this moonshot shit, I don't know. What the hell, they know what the market
is." The Austin Report, Winter 1986, at 1.
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first year of rookie contracts) are to a great extent in accordance with the
round and overall selection position the athlete is chosen in the draft.
Thus, a middle to late first-round selection will receive a signing bonus
and base salary markedly larger than that of a third-round selection.
The development of a semi-structured pay scale has changed the
role of a contract advisor and has shifted some of the emphasis in con-
tract negotiation to areas which have traditionally been neglected or
overlooked. With the decline and eventual disappearance of the USFL,
the player representative has witnessed a vital bargaining chip vanish
into the bankruptcy courts. Thus, a player agent must devote his person-
alized attention to the strengths and weaknesses of each of his clients and
develop a string of performance bonuses that enable the athlete to receive
fair compensation for his services. An agent must now possess the
unique mixture of being a skilled negotiator and a keen evaluator of tal-
ent in order to incorporate the proper performance clauses into the
contract.74
A contract advisor who devotes a substantial amount of time and
effort in this area of the negotiating process is in essence justifying a great
portion of the compensation he receives for the right to act as a players'
representative. An agent who negotiates a contract which meets the av-
erage return in signing bonus and base salary and in turn ignores the
importance of developing that fragment of the agreement pertaining to
incentive clauses and performance bonuses is derelict in his professional
responsibility to effectively negotiate a contract that is commensurate to
the potential earning power of the athlete.
The regulations also accurately assess the worth of the agent's input
into the negotiation of the option year of a contract by excluding that
portion of the agreement from the contract advisors fee schedule.
75
Under the 1982 CBA, a veteran free agent may sign with his original
ballclub at its "last best written offer given on or before February 1 of
that year, or... a one-year contract with no option year with his old club
at 110% of the salary provided in his contract for the preceding year
74. For example, a contract advisor must be aware of performance bonuses that are geared
primarily for players who "start" on their respective clubs. A typical incentive clause offered
by NFL management is a bonus for participating in 50% of the offensive plays from scrim-
mage throughout the season. However, should a player become injured during the season,
particularly in the early portion of the year, the athlete will never be able to fulfill the bonus
requirements. Therefore, the well-prepared contract advisor might seek to incorporate a modi-
fication of this clause by demanding the inclusion of a bonus for a player who participates in
50% of the offensive plays from scrimmage while on the team's active roster.
75. See NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at 11.
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",76
The agent who shares in the financial reward of a client's contract
renewal at a mere ten percent as mandated in the CBA, would result in
unjustly rewarding the contract advisor for services that deserve little
renumeration. Of course the regulations do not forbid the agent from
sharing in the benefits received for the negotiation of a renewal, modifica-
tion or extension of the original contract at a salary above the minimum
amount proscribed in the CBA.77
Through the strict guidelines set forth in the NFLPA regulations,
the professional sports agent must expand his knowledge and develop his
skill and expertise in an area that he otherwise would not have devoted a
significant amount of time towards. Although some commentators may
argue that the exclusion of incentive clauses from the fee schedule of
contract advisors actually discourages consideration of these facets to the
bargaining process, the professional representative must emphasize the
importance of developing the proper mixture of performance clauses
within the contract while not neglecting the more publicized negotiation
of signing bonuses and base salaries.
While the NFLPA has made significant strides in establishing an
effective certification process, there are still some major gaps in the regu-
lations' scope and range. The current CBA and NFLPA certification
process omits contract advisors of unsigned rookies from the scope of the
regulatory process. A collegiate player entering the NFL draft is not
considered a member of the unit of employees that constitutes the
NFLPA and its representatives.78 In particular, the ramifications of this
loophole are only amplified when considering the chance of abuse is
greatly heightened in connection with those athletes who are just drafted
and venturing into the business world for the very first time.79
In direct contrast to this omission of the NFLPA certification sys-
tem, the National Basketball Players Association (hereinafter "NBPA")
has implemented a screening process strikingly similar to that of the
NFLPA plan.8" However, the NBPA certification regulation explicitly
governs all contract negotiations involving rookies and veteran free
76. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 57, at 25.
77. See NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at 11.
78. Telephone interview with Cheryl Davis, Agent Certification Coordinator of the
NFLPA (Dec. 8, 1986). See also Forbes, Agents Still Get Free Shot at NFL's Rookie Crop,
USA Today, Feb. 18, 1987, sec. C, at 7, col. 1.
79. Davis interview, supra note 78.
80. See generally NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS (1986) at Fore-
word. (Hereinafter "NBPA REGULATIONS").
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agents. 81
As of March 7, 1986, the NBPA initiated a certification and regula-
tory system for contract advisors. The impetus for the creation of the
regulation "was the increasing recognition among NBA players of the
need ... to ensure that agents representing players (including rookies) in
individual contract negotiations with NBA teams provide services of a
high quality at fee levels that are fair and equitable. ,8' The NBPA
further states the need to establish a program that assists players and
rookies in selecting individual agents.83
The NBPA regulations governing player agents differs in other areas
of vital importance. In computing the maximum allowable fee accorded
the contract advisor, the NBPA defines the term "compensation" as in-
cluding "base salary, signing bonus and any performance bonus actually
received by the player."84 Thus, it would appear that the NBPA regula-
tions are completely contradictory from that of the NFLPA certification
process.
However, upon closer examination, the NBPA justifies the inclusion
of performance bonuses within the expanse of the agent's fee schedule by
drastically reducing the maximum compensation permitted in individual
contract negotiations. Under the NBPA regulation, the agent receives a
fee of four percent of the compensation negotiated for the player for each
playing season. 85 The dramatic decrease in the maximum fee collected
by an agent is neutralized by the inclusion of incentive and performance
bonuses within the agent's fee schedule. The NBPA regulations arguably
combine the more desirable aspects of the NFLPA system by establish-
ing a preliminary screening process of prospective contract advisor's with
a system that recognizes the need for restrictions on the amount of
money charged by an agent for his services. The inclusion of perform-
ance bonuses within the contract advisor's financial reach might actually
encourage the player representative to devote an increased amount of
time and effort on that portion of the bargaining process.
III. THE CALIFORNIA ATHLETE AGENCY ACT
The State of California created legislation intended to protect ath-
letes from potential abuse prevalent in the profession. The Athlete
81. See generally NBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 80.
82. Id. at Foreword.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id.
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Agents Act86 is closely modeled after California's Talent Agencies Act,
which is similarly designed to protect artists seeking employment in the
entertainment industry."'
Nonetheless, the legislation is plagued by a wide range of problems
involving its intended scope and application. Generally, the language of
the Act is ineffective to combat the major problems inherent within the
industry. A primary example of the deficiency of the legislation is re-
flected in the amount of the bond required to be posted by athlete
agents.88 Prior to the issuance or renewal of a registration, a surety bond
in the penal sum of $25,000 must be deposited with the Labor Commis-
sioner.89 The purpose of the bond is to encourage the agent to comply
with the regulations and pay for damages due to "intentional or uninten-
tional misstatement, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit or any unlawful or
negligent acts or commissions or omissions of the registered athlete
agency .... 9 The amount of the bond is merely cosmetic in nature
since it is miniscule when compared to the average compensation paid to
professional sports figures.91
Moreover, the Act is lacking in the most common areas of educa-
tional and character requirements. 92 The application for registration is
accompanied by affidavits or certificates of completion of any and all for-
mal training or practical experience in any of the following specific areas:
contract negotiation, complaint resolution, arbitration, or civil resolution
of contract disputes.93 When compared to the educational and character
requirements needed to practice law in the State of California, the Act
falls far short in ensuring the licensing of effective professional
representation.94
The screening process instituted by the California Legislature has
proven to be woefully inadequate in its attempt to stifle the onslaught of
unprofessional contract advisors from entering the marketplace.
The most controversial portion of the Act is its treatment of attor-
neys. As defined in the Code, an "athlete agent" is:
86. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West Supp. 1986).
87. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700 et seq. (West Supp. 1986).
88. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1519(a) (West Supp. 1986).
89. Id.
90. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1520(a) (West Supp. 1986).
91. The 1985 average base salary in the NFL was $164,320. Information is based upon
statistics released by the NFLPA offices.
92. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1511(d) (West Supp. 1986).
93. Id.
94. Comment, Attorneys and the California Athlete Agencies Act: The Toll of the Bill, 7
COMM./ENT. L.J. 551, 588 (1984).
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[A]ny person who, as an independent contractor, directly or
indirectly, recruits or solicits any person to enter into any agent
contract or professional sport services contract, or for a fee pro-
cures, offers, promises, or attempts to obtain employment for
any person with a professional sport team or as a professional
athlete.95
An athlete agent does not include "any member of the State Bar of Cali-
fornia when acting as legal counsel for any person."
'96
The exemption of attorneys from regulation under the Act is based
on the premise that legal practitioners are regulated by the State Bar of
California and its accompanying Code of Ethics.97 However, attorneys
who go beyond the narrow scope of offering "legal counsel" might be
subject to the agency legislation. Even an attorney who represents a lim-
ited amount of athletes and offers advice and counsel in areas including
insurance, endorsements, and perhaps financial planning, would need to
file an application with the state legislature.
The requirement that attorneys who provide guidance in areas aside
from legal counsel is economically unrealistic considering the fact that in
addition to a surety bond, a filing fee and annual registration fee is neces-
sary under the Act.9" A contract advisor's duties outside of the tradi-
tional realm of "legal counsel" includes the negotiation of endorsement
contracts and personal appearances. These demands of the agent have
become inextricably interwoven into the fabric of the well-prepared
sports agent's strategies and methods and without a workable definition
that would allow for more flexibility for professional legal counselors.
Presently, many attorneys are not registered under the Act based upon
the "legal counsel exemption." 99 Whether it is an attorney with just a
few clients, or one with a long list of athletic superstars, the constraints
and requirements placed upon attorneys operating as sports agents are
both ineffective and misplaced. The California State Legislature must be
sensitive to the changing role and demands of the sports agent/attorney
and institute a code which will better effectuate the intended goals of the
Act.
Perhaps the single most viable alternative would be the creation of a
standardized examination offered to all agent applicants. "00 Considering
95. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1500(b) (West Supp. 1986).
96. Id.
97. See Comment, supra note 94, at 565.
98. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1517 (West Supp. 1986).
99. See Comment, supra note 94, at 562.
100. For example, an agent who represents several mid-round draft choices and charges an
average fee of five percent for his services would have difficulty overcoming the cost of filing
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the fact that in order to practice law an applicant must satisfy educa-
tional and character requirements and pass a rigorous bar examination, a
system that would require a prospective sports agent to pass an exam
designed to evaluate his/her competency would establish a much more
sophisticated representative.' 0 '
Although some argue that the total number of agents is so small as
not to justify such a rigorous system, the fact that competition for the
336 draftees for the annual NFL draft has escalated each year would
indicate the need for reform.' 2 Additionally, in light of the fact that the
Labor Commissioner is demanding an average of $2,000 for granting of a
license, the monies generated for the input and administration of the leg-
islation are available and present.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no dispute that a professional and well-prepared contract
advisor can play a vital role in the earnings of a professional athlete. The
role of the sports agent has generally remained the same for the past
decade: maximize the financial position of his client through contract
negotiation, endorsements and other business opportunities. The method
by which this must be accomplished has been dramatically affected by
the intensified scrutiny of the activities of the sports agent.
The certification and regulation procedures initiated by various
players associations and legislators have helped redefine and solidify the
position of the sports agent within the business world of professional
sports. Although these systems are designed to protect the naive athlete
from financial suicide, there are many areas in which the licensing proce-
dures need a stricter application to the important issues confronting the
problem. An establishment of some uniformity in fee schedules com-
bined with effective measures to combat the recurring problems inherent
in the field are crucial components of any model regulatory system.
The sports agent must now possess the ability to evaluate the skills
and strengths of his client and incorporate these qualities of the athlete
into a sound financial package. The intensified certification and regula-
tion of the contract advisor has in turn redirected the emphasis of the
sports agent into areas that better ensures the effective and competent
representation of professional athletes.
fees and related expenses dictated by the Athlete Agency Act. This in essence encourages
player representatives to ignore the legislation in order to survive as a profitable enterprise.
101. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1255.
102. The Austin Report, Winter 1987, at 3.
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